Maize policy in Kenya by Massell, Benton F. et al.
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribuiion-NonCommerciai-
NoDerivs 3.0 Licence. 
To view a copy of the licence please see: 
http://creativecommons.0rg/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ 
IDS UBR 
RESERVE COL 
INSTITUTE FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, NAIROBI 
Discussion Paper No. 20 
Maize Policy in Kenya 
B. P. Massell 
J. Heyer 
H. Karani 
December 1965 
This paper was prepared initially as a memorandum for the 
Maize Commission of Inquiry. It is intended to serve the 
purpose of helping to provide an analytical framework 
within which the question of maize policy can be examined. 
MAIZE POLICY IN KENYA 
MEMORANDUM PREPARED FOR THE MAIZE 
COMMISSION OF' INQUIRY 
THE MAIZE PROBLEM 
Maize poses a unique problem in Kenya, a problem 
which can be understood only if viewed in proper perspective. 
The maize problem has several elements: 
(a) Maize is used principally as the staple food of 
the vast majority of Kenyans. Because of the role of maize 
in the Kenyan diet, there is little attempt to substitute 
other foods for maize as the maize price rises, or to consume 
appreciably more maize as its price declines. To use the 
economists' term, the domestic demand for maize is highly 
price-inelastic. The increase in the quantity of maize 
demanded is roughly proportional to the increase in population 
(b) Due to the sensitivity of maize yields to rainfall 
and other climatic factors, and due to the variability of 
climatic conditions in Kenya from one year to another, maize 
yields are subject to large annual fluctuations. Consequently 
the maize output obtainable from a given acreage varies un-
predictably from year to year. 
(c) Because maize is heavy and bulky relative to its 
value, transport costs are high. As a result, there is a 
big spread between the price that Kenya receives for exports 
and the price Kenya pays for imports. The cost of producing 
maize domestically can vary within a fairly broad range and 
still remain both above the export price and below the import 
price. The cost of producing maize is currently believed 
to lie in this range, so that it is believed uneconomic for 
Kenya to rely on world markets, either as an importer or as 
an exporter. 
These three points, taken jointly, pose a dilemma. 
As it is uneconomic to import maize, it is natural for Kenya 
to strive for self-sufficiency. But, as it is also uneconomic 
to export maize, it is natural to plan to produce no more 
than is demanded domestically. Thus, the best strategy would 
appear to be for Kenya to produce enough, but only enough, 
to satisfy local demand. However, because it is not possible 
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to foresee the weather, it is impossible to get maize out-
put equal to demand in each year. And because demand is 
inelastic, the quantity demanded does not adjust to changes 
in annual supply. If there were a free market in maize, the 
annual fluctuations in supply would lead to sharp fluctuations 
in price (as has been the case in Uganda). Because of the 
important role of maize in the economy, this is unacceptable. 
The maize problem can be divided into three sub-
sections: production and storage policy; pricing! and 
marketing. We will begin with a discussion of production 
and storage. 
B. PRODUCTION AND STORAGE 
1. Production: 
Production policy involves selecting the level of 
annual domestic maize production to aim for. Production 
depends on the acreage planted, the techniques of product-
ion employed, and the weather. Associated with any selected 
level of production is an acreage that, given the techniques 
of production over the period considered, will on average 
produce the output required. The acreage that is needed for 
a given level of production will be changing in Kenya because 
of the radical changes in techniques of production that are 
taking place with the introduction of hybrid seed, and 
It is important to note that, becatise of the vari-
ability of the weather, the target output will seldom be 
achieved in any one year. The best one can accomplish is to 
achieve target output on the average over a period of time, 
with some years falling short of the target and other years 
exceeding the target, and with the excesses roughly balanc-
ing the shortfalls. It makes little sense to view maize 
policy in the context of a single season. Whatever the 
production policy, shortfalls and excesses in individual 
years will be inevitable. One hesitates to raise a point 
as seemingly obvious as this; however, much of the discuss-
ion of this year's maize crop, as reported in the press, 
did in fact take a very short-term view of the problem. 
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2. Storage: 
Once the acreage has "been decided so as to provide 
for a selected output on average over the years (rising as 
population grows), provision must be made for disposing of 
surpluses in good years and providing for shortfalls in 
bad years. One way to do this is to export the surpluses 
and import the shortfalls. But, as noted, this is a costly 
procedure. The major alternative is storage. 
The costs of storage consist of depreciation; 
interest on capital tied up in buildings, other equipment, 
and maize stocks themselves; additional transport and hand-
ling costs; fumigation; loss due to spoilage; and admini-
strative costs. By comparing these costs with the costs 
associated with relying on foreign trade, one can arrive 
at an optimal storage policy, and an optimal amount of 
storage capacity for the Kenya maize economy. Without 
making a detailed comparison of these costs, it is not 
possible to say whether optimal capacity is greater or 
less than present capacity. However, present capacity 
has never been properly assessed according to these criteria, 
and it is likely that the optimal amount is very substanti-
ally higher than the present capacity of only 1.66 million 
bags. We feel that the gain to the Kenya economy of 
investigating and adopting an optimal storage policy would 
be very large. One of our principal recommendations is 
that such an investigation be conducted. 
Of course, the size of storage capacity is only 
one aspect of storage pulicy. It is important also to 
adopt a consistent set of rules governing when to increase 
and decrease maize stocks. One wonders if even the exist-
ing capacity in Kenya has been fully utilised. We believe 
that the Maize Marketing Board must resist the temptation 
to earn a few pounds from the export of surplus maize, un-
less this is consistent with a positive storage policy. 
3. Hybrid Seed: 
The development and gradual introduction of hybrid 
seed is likely to have a profound effect on the maize picture 
in Kenya. This does not alter the need to view maize in 
the context of an analytical framework similar to that 
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suggested here. However, it does imply that the cost of 
maize production can be expected to drop over time as a 
larger number of farmers employ the hybrid seed and thus 
obtain substantially greater yields. 
Kenya can respond to this change in technology 
in three ways: (a) cut back acreage; (b) increase output 
and plan to enter export markets; (c) explore possible 
avenues of utilizing a maize surplus internally. 
(a) It will probably pay to cut back acreage in at 
least some marginal areas, so that a relatively large 
proportion of the maize crop is grown where production is 
relatively economic. Of course, before recommending that 
maize production be cut back in any particular area, it 
would be well to ensure that there are alternative crops 
that can be grown more economically than maize, or that 
there are alternative forms of employment for the people 
in these areas. It makes no sense to reduce maize product-
ion in any area if the only alternative is unemployment. 
(b) Even with a reduction of output in marginal areas, 
output may expand as a greater number of acres is planted 
to hybrid. If the maize thus grown can economically be 
exported, then certainly Kenya should take steps that 
encourage production for ezport. It is difficult to 
predict now whether this will be the case. Much depends 
not only on what happens to domestic maize costs of product-
ion, but also on the trend of world market prices. If 
hybrid seed is introduced in a large number of countries 
throughout the world, as seems likely to be the case, 
then maize prices may fall to the point where it is un-
economic to produce for export, even with substantially 
higher yields than are obtained today. 
(c) It may be possible to use surplus maize domestic-
ally. First, as noted above, the domestic demand for maize 
as a foodstuff can be expected to continue to increase for 
some time. Second, there may be opportunities for industrial 
processing as the price falls. Kenya can explore the economics 
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of producing such, goods as starch, breakfast cereals, maize 
germ, and alcohol. Still a third possibility is to expand 
the use of maize as an animal feed as price falls. 
C. PRICE POLICY 
1. The Price of Maize: 
The relative price of maize is the most important 
factor determining the volume of domestic production. For 
this reason, price policy is the principal instrument of 
production policy. 
But the maize price also has other effects upon the 
economy. For example, because maize is the staple food of 
the vast majority of people in Kenya, the consumer price 
clearly has an important effect on the cost of living of 
these people and on their real incomes. Moreover, through 
its effect on the cost of living, the maize price may also 
influence wage rates and the cost of labor throughout the 
economy. Furthermore, by affecting the relative attractive-
ness of maize farming, as opposed to growing other crops 
and as opposed to other forms of employment, the maize price 
influences the pattern of agricultural production and, to 
some extent, the balance between urban and rural population. 
Finally, because changes in the maize price affect different 
population groups in different ways, the maize price helps 
determine the distribution of income. It is clear then that 
determination of the maize price has far-reaching implicat-
ions for the Kenya economy. 
If there were a single price that could be regarded 
as THE maize price and if this price were the sole determinant 
of maize supply, there would be little scope for achieving 
multiple objectives; the price would have to be set to 
bring forth the desired production, and that would be that. 
Fortunately, though, the Government has considerable flexi-
bility in formulating maize price policy. Price is only a 
shorthand expression for what really amounts to a set of 
prices. For example, the price paid to producers differs 
from that paid by consumers, and the producer price in 
Nyanza Province differs from that in Coast Province. 
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2. Other Factors: 
Other factors also help determine the supply of 
maize. The prices of alternative crops are of obvious 
importance. Also important are factors affecting the cost 
of production, such as the availability of hybrid seed, 
the effectiveness of agricultural extention workers, prices 
of fertilizer and other inputs; all of these can be in-
fluenced by Government policy. The marketing arrangements — 
discussed in Section D — are also important for they affect 
the thinness of the market and the degree of risk attaching 
to maize production. In formulating price policy, the 
Government must take into account all of the instruments 
at its disposal and determine how they can best be used 
to serve its objectives. 
3. Large-scale and Small-scale Farms: 
Approximately 5 percent of Kenya's domestic maize 
production is provided by the large-scale (mainly European) 
farms. On these farms, maize production is a strictly 
commercial venture. For this reason, and because of the 
presence of readily available alternative crops, the number 
of acres planted to maize is highly sensitive to the maize 
price. If the producer price is raised, other factors 
remaining constant, large-scale farmers tend to plant 
more acres to maize, thereby increasing maize output. 
The remaining 95 percent of Kenya's maize crop is 
produced by small-scale (African) farmers. Most of these 
farmers produce maize primarily for home consumption, but 
approximately 5 - 1 0 percent of the maize crop grown on 
the small farms is offered for sale. 
There are several reasons why the Government has 
focused on the large farms in establishing its maize policy. 
Because the large farms produce almost entirely for the 
market, and because they provide about half of the marketed 
output, price policy has been geared to conditions on these 
farms. This policy overlooks the large potential maize 
supply from the small-scale farms. And it fails to consider 
the effect of the maize price on resource allocation, wage 
rates, and real incomes. 
The relative ease with which information on the 
cost of production on large farms can be obtained, and the 
lack of knowledge about the operation of small farms have 
also been important in leading the Government to focus 
on the large farms. For example, there is little inform-
ation on the relative economics of maize vs. alternative 
crops on African farms. For is there much information on 
how small-scale farmers respond to changes in price. This 
absence of information does not provide a rationale for 
concentrating attention on the large farms. Rather, it 
constitutes a need for further research on the small farms, 
which make up a substantial part of the agricultural 
economy. 
Another argument for basing price policy on large-
scale farming costs has been that the production on the 
European farms is asserted to be more stable and dependable 
than production on African farms. Both the Troup Report 
and the Sessional Paper on the Maize Industry make this 
point. The figures in Table 1, relating to marketed 
production, show that this point is not supported by the 
facts: A simple measure of year-to-year variation shows 
that the difference between the two groups is negligible. 
If anything, maize sales by the small-scale farms have 
been slightly less variable^ 
1 
The standard deviation about the mean is 222 for the 
large farms and 220 for the small farms. 
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Table 1 
Marketed Production of Maize in Kenya, 1954 - 65 
(thousands of bags) 
large farms Small farms 
1954/55 1299 1001 
1955/56 651 1081 
1956/57 638 896 
1957/58 793 989 
1958/59 893 857 
1959/60 822 788 
1960/61 880 706 
1961/62 850 768 
1962/63 1118 1206 
1963/64 583 502 
1964/65 601 522. 
Sources: Government of Kenya, Statistical Abstract 
1964; and figures supplied by Government 
of Kenya, Ministry of Economic Planning 
and Development, Economics and Statistics 
Division. 
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4-. Price and Supply: 
In formulating price policy, the place to begin 
is with, a consideration of objectives. It follows from 
the discussion of Section A ana B that provision of an 
adequate supply is a prime objective. To achieve this 
objective requires that the maize price be sufficiently 
high to encourage production. 
Because the small-scale farmers produce maize 
principally for home consumption, it is often argued that 
they are not influenced by market prices. Admistedly, the 
production and sale of maize is less price-elastic on small 
than on large farms. However, there is evidence that small-
scale farmers are guided by prices. 
Both the producer and consumer prices affect the 
production and sale of maize on the African farms. Farmers 
who produce primarily or solely for sale are influenced by 
the producer price. As this price rises relatively to the 
prices of other crops, farmers tend to shift more acres 
into maize production. Farmers who produce primarily for 
their own consumption are influenced more by the consumer 
price. If maize is expensive to buy, subsistence farmers 
will tend to grow enough for their own needs; but if the 
price of maize is low, subsistence farmers may grow other 
crops to exchange for maize, thus reducing total maize 
production. 
On the European farms, maize theft has been an 
important factor tending to reduce output. The acreage 
planted to maize decreases, the greater the prevalence of 
theft. And the incentives to steal are greater, the higher 
the price. For these two reasons, there may be a negative 
relationship between output and price on the large farms. 
Within some price range, acreage may decline as price is 
raised. It is worth keeping this in mind in formulating 
price policy. 
The structure of prices among regions of the 
country and between large and small farms determines how 
the maize output is distributed among different groups. 
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The Government should take steps to see that any given out-
put of maize is produced at the lowest cost. This means 
distributing the target production among regions and between 
large and small farms in a way which reflects differences 
in costs. Ideally, the marginal cost of maize production 
should be equated in all areas. 
Because yields are higher on the large-scale farms, 
it is often argued that these farms should provide the 
large part of the marketed maize crop. However, higher 
yields do not imply lower economic cost. The relevant 
measure of cost is opportunity cost — the value of output 
foregone by the resources used. This measures the real 
social cost to the country of producing a bag of maize in 
any particular area. 
In the European areas, opportunity cost can be 
easily calculated. We know that there is a high rate of 
substitutability between maize and other crops — notably 
wheat and barley. If the price paid the European producers 
is reduced, these farmers will shift into other crops which 
can be grown almost as profitably. 
In the African areas, we have less information on 
opportunity costs. On many small-scale farms, maize yields 
are low. But costs of production are low as well. It may 
pay to encourage greater maize production on some African 
farms despite low yields. At the same time, it will surely 
pay to conduct further research on the economics of growing 
maize and other crops on these farms, and to consider 
measures that will improve the efficiency of small-scale 
farming. 
If the Government wishes to encourage greater 
production in African areas without at the same time encourage-
ing greater European maize output, there are several ways 
of doing so. If the maize price is raised, production will 
increase in both African and European areas, and the relative 
increase will likely be greater in the latter. However, if 
in addition to raising the maize price, the wheat and 
barley prices are raised as well, then a relatively greater 
increase in maize production will occur on the African farms. 
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The Government may wish to consider policies of this sort, that 
enable it to affect not only the overall level of maize product-
ion, but also its distribution among areas. 
5. Specialization on African Farms: 
In some areas of Kenya, maize is an uneconomic crop. 
In these areas, it does not pay to produce maize for sale, 
given the price obtaining in today's market. However, because 
of the large spread between the buying and selling price, it 
does pay in many cases to grow maize for one's own needs. 
Thus, farmers are encouraged to grow an uneconomic crop. It 
would be desirable in such cases to encourage farmers to 
shift from maize to other crops, providing a more efficient 
use of resources and encouraging integration into the 
market economy. 
One way to do this is to reduce the cost of market-
ing, so that for a given producer price, the consumer price 
will be reduced. (We discuss marketing in Section D„) 
Another way to reduce the spread between the consumer and 
producer prices is for the Government to absorb part of the 
marketing costs. In the short run, this will entail sub-
sidization of maize cons-umption. In the long run,however, 
as farmers develop a market orientation, the economy will 
be able to develop along sounder lines, rewarding the Govern-
ment for its efforts. While we do not have enough inform-
ation to recommend a subsidy, we consider the idea of suffi-
cient importance to warrant further study. 
6. Rural-Urban Balance and Wage Costs: 
Maize price policy has an important influence on the 
population balance between rural and urban areas. Low 
rural incomes, resulting from low produoer prices, tend to 
reinforce the drift to the towns to seek urban employment. 
Low consumer prices imply a low cost of living in urban 
areas,.and similarly encourage migration to these areas. 
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If the Government wishes to retard, the flow to the cities, 
high maize producer and consumer prices will help accomplish 
this. 
However, a high consumer price for maize lowers the 
real incomes of people who buy maize, notably urban wage-
earners. This in turn is likely to lead to upward pressure 
on wage rates, and hence on labor costs. A high maize 
price is thus likely to contribute to high costs of product-
ion in Kenyan industry. In formulating price policy, the 
Government should weigh the advantages arising from low 
labor costs against the costs associated with urban drift. 
MARKETING 
Government Control: 
The need for some control over the marketing of maize 
is widely accepted in Kenya because of the special position 
of maize in the economy. The acceptance of the principle of 
control runs through most of the Government reports and 
sessional papers that deal with the maize industry. In 1962 
the World Bank Report on Kenya endorsed this view, stating 
that "some form of organised marketing is essential". There 
is, however, disagreement over the form that control should 
take. 
The system adopted by the Kenya Government aims at 
complete control over all stages of the marketing of the 
maize crop. There are strict rules that control prices to 
the producer and consumer, traders' commissions and margins, 
payment for transport, storage and purchasing procedures, 
and charges for milling. This comprehensive system of 
controls may serve a purpose, in regulating the supply and 
stabilizing the price.. However, the chaos associated with 
this year's maize shortage, the rigidity of the present 
system, the opportunities it provides for graft and corrupt-
ion, and the encouragement it gives to black market operat-
ions all suggest that relaxation of maize control may be in 
order. Moreover, it seems likely that the present system 
of control has contributed to the wide differential between 
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consumer and producer prices in several ways. First, any 
extensive system of controls has a large administrative 
cost associated with it," Governments are not typically 
efficient organizations. Second, there is some evidence 
that the present maize control system results in higher 
transport costs than would obtain in a freer market. Third, 
the cost of black market operations (including the cost of 
enforcement) arising from the present controls would be 
reduced with a less stringent form of control. 
However, criticism of the present form of comprehens-
ive controls does not imply rejection of the principle of 
control altogether. One can choose a middle ground, with 
the Government exerting a stabilizing influence on maize 
marketing, but at the same time providing scope for 
individual initiative in buying, transporting, milling, and 
selling. 
What we suggest is that the Government provide a 
producer floor price and a consumer ceiling price, to be 
maintained by Government transactions in the market. Price 
fluctuations would be allowed between these limits, and 
commercial transactions would take place without involving 
the Government. When the producer price declines, the 
Government would stand ready to buy at the floor price. 
Similarly, when the maize price rises, the Government would 
stand ready to sell at the ceiling price. 
Typically, in years of domestic maize surplus, the 
Government would be a net buyer, and in years of shortfall 
a net seller. As discussed in Section B, surpluses would 
be used to build up storage capacity which would be drawn 
upon in deficit years. The spread between the buying and 
selling price could be set so as to permit the Government to 
cover the cost of storage, transport, plus any administrative 
costs. The scheme would help remove the present incentive 
for black market operations. It would also help reduce the 
costs of maize distribution, and hence the spread between 
consumer and producer prices. We think: therefore that it 
deserves careful consideration by Government."'" 
The scheme was suggested by the World Bank mission to 
Kenya in 1962, but was rejected without adequate consider-
ation. 
